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Although it remains a one-party state, Vietnam has become one of the most popular host 
countries for multilateral and bilateral aid donors during the past decade. Vietnam’s 
popularity is largely explained by the fact that it perceived as a good aid recipient, and it 
has often been identified as a “best practice” example of how a government can manage 
external aid and own its development agenda. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the 
roots of Vietnam’s strong ownership and to examine how the relations between the state 
and the donor community have influenced Vietnamese development planning. The first 
part of the paper highlights the uneven relation with the Soviet Union during the 1970s 
and 1980s as an explanation for the present ambitions to avoid dependence on foreign 
partners. The second part outlines the institutional setup for development planning that 
was created to match the existing institutions for central planning during the 1990s. The 
third part discusses the ongoing changes in the role of the state and in the institutional 
setup for development planning. The process of change is illustrated using the 
Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy as an example. The paper 
concludes that donors have contributed both directly and indirectly to the changes in the 
Vietnamese model of economic planning, and that the donor community has to some 
extent taken on the roles played by civil society and a political opposition in 
parliamentary democracies.  
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  11. Introduction and context 
Vietnam has become one of the most popular host countries for multilateral and bilateral 
aid donors during the past decade – for instance, it is the World Bank’s second largest aid 
recipient today. This is remarkable considering that Vietnam is still a communist one-
party state and that most donors have a relatively short history of development 
cooperation in the country. Aside from its good performance in poverty reduction and 
economic growth, Vietnam is popular because it is perceived as a “good” aid recipient: in 
fact, Vietnam is often identified as the “best practice” example when it comes to aid 
management and government ownership of the development agenda (Conway 2004; 
GRIPS 2002; UNDP 1996). 
Vietnam’s good reputation is often explained with the government’s decision to introduce 
an economic reform program in 1986, long before the international donor community had 
launched any official aid programs to support the country’s transition to a market 
economy. As a result, the government was able to maintain the lead in its relations with 
the many foreign development partners that entered the country some years later. It was 
also to maintain a centralized system of development planning.
1 The outcome in terms of 
development and poverty reduction has been highly successful. Vietnam emerged as an 
interesting market and investment location already a few years after the introduction of 
Doi Moi, despite the continuing dominance of the state sector. Economic development 
accelerated, reaching a peak in the mid-1990s when the annual GDP growth rate 
exceeded 9 percent. The share of the population living in poverty fell from 70 percent in 
1987 to 29 percent in 2002. The donor community has played an important role in this 
process, with annual aid flows increasing from a few hundred million in 1990 to over 1.5 
billion since the late 1990s.  
Today, the Vietnamese state desires faster international integration. Further 
comprehensive reforms are needed to fulfill this objective, and the donor community has 
pledged to commit substantial resource to facilitate the country’s development and 
internationalization. However, the state still wants to play a dominant role in this process. 
One central question is how the relation between the state and the donor community has 
influenced Vietnamese development and development planning. The purpose of this 
paper is to examine if and how the role of the state in development planning and aid 
management has changed due to external influences from foreign aid and interactions 
with donors. We therefore explore the institutional factors that determine how the state 
organizes development planning and integrates donors in the process of development and 
change. Historical experiences and the government’s internal politics constitute the core 
of our analysis in explaining both the present institutional setting for development 
planning as well as the causes for change. Some scenarios for the future are also 
discussed.  
                                                 
1 The term “foreign development partners” refers here to multilateral donors, bilateral donors, and 
international non-governmental organizations. 
  12. From Soviet aid to development cooperation  
Dependence on Soviet aid 
The development process in Vietnam before Doi Moi was influenced by both internal and 
external factors. The experiences from this period were fundamental determinants of the 
government’s cautious attitudes towards foreigners in the years immediately after the 
introduction of Doi Moi. The priority in the relations with foreign actors was to defend 
the autonomy of the nation. 
After reunification in 1975, Vietnam faced severe economic challenges. Attempting to 
introduce a socialist regime throughout the country, especially focusing on the South, the 
government introduced public collectivization of labor and other factors of production. 
Anti-capitalist campaigns ordered by the government in March 1978 led to a clampdown 
on “bourgeois trade” to drive out the private business sector that remained in the southern 
parts of the country (Asia 1979 Yearbook). However, the command economy was largely 
made up of an inefficient agricultural sector, with only a very industrial production: at the 
time, this led foreign experts to refer to the country as a “vegetable civilization” (quoted 
in Bui 1974, p.7). The economy relied heavily on economic aid from China (roughly 
USD 300 million per year) and a small number of Western countries. However, these aid 
flows were interrupted when the government’s decision to send troops to Cambodia at the 
end of 1978 led to economic and diplomatic sanctions by both Western and Asian 
countries – these sanctions came to remain in place for the following decade (the US 
sanctions were not lifted until 1995).  
As a result of the sanctions, Vietnam was forced to move closer to the Soviet Union and 
the Eastern European communist bloc for trade and economic aid. Throughout the 1980s, 
the economy was heavily dependent on Soviet aid, which made up about 10 percent of 
GDP and covered more than 40 percent of the government budget and 75 percent of total 
public investment at its peak in the mid-1980s. At the same time, the share of trade with 
the Soviet Union reached about 70 percent of Vietnam’s total foreign trade. The only 
official aid that Vietnam received from others than the Soviet bloc during the 1980s came 
from a few remaining donors such as Sweden, Finland and the United Nations, 
amounting to about USD 100 million yearly. With total annual aid inflows estimated at 
about USD 1 billion, Soviet aid clearly overshadowed the aid from the West. McCarty 
(2000) shows that Soviet grant aid and soft loans supplied 90 percent of Vietnam’s 
petroleum, iron and steel, machinery, fertilizer and cotton imports. It financed hundreds 
of state enterprises and accounted for 95 percent of coal production, 51 percent of cement 
output, and 35 percent of electricity generation. Table 1 shows how the dependence on 
the Soviet Union increased consistently during the 1976-1986 period (in tandem with the 
growing inefficiency of the domestic command economy) at the same time as the deficit 
in the trade with the Soviet Union increased sharply over the same period. One result was 
a very high level of external debt. On the domestic arena, the reliance on Soviet aid 
resulted in pessimistic views regarding Vietnam’s own economic potential. Whenever 
things started go wrong, a common reaction was “Don’t worry! The Soviet brother will 
take care of it”. Like other areas, development planning also depended on Soviet aid. 
  2Externally, the reliance on the Soviet Union forced Vietnam to implement modest and 
dependent politics – on conditions outlined by the Soviet Union – in return for economic 
and military support.  















Union / total 
trade 
1976  n.a. n.a. n.a.  393  -224 38% 
1977  n.a. n.a. n.a.  548  -196 41% 
1978  700-1000 600-800  1300-1800  669  -224  36% 
1979  800-1100 900-1400  1700-2500  905  -455  45% 
1980  2900-3200 800-900 3700-4100  943  -458  48% 
1981  900 900-1000  1800-1900  1239 -774  60% 
1982  1200 1000 2200  1392  -823  67% 
1983  1300 1200 2500  1529  -899  69% 
1984  1400 1300 2700  1546  -914  65% 
1985  1600 1700 3300  1750  -1072 65% 
1986  1800 1500 3300  2297  -1459 71% 
Sources: Based on information from Pike (1987), p.139 and IMF (1987), pp.412-13. 
From economic dependence to autonomy  
When Soviet aid diminished and eventually ended after the mid-1980s, it forced the 
Vietnamese leadership to revise its policies and adopt an economic reform program. At 
the same time, the perception of the economy changed: economics became an area with 
important connections to national security, which required a strong state that could 
control economic development and external relations.  
Judging from our interviews with various groups within and outside the party and 
government, it seems clear that the contemporaneous reactions to Doi Moi varied 
between different groups in the leadership. For some groups, the reduction of Soviet aid 
provided a welcome reason for the leadership to rethink domestic politics and to take the 
initiative for reform. “Renewal or Death” was an argument heard in connection with the 
VI Party Congress in 1986, indicating the urgent need for radical change (Duong 1991, 
p.26). The choice was “Renewal”, including decollectivization of farming, reductions in 
subsidies, price liberalization, and marketization. The Doi Moi program was meant to 
move the economy from central planning to a “socialist market economy”. However, 
although concepts like markets, capitalism, and economic liberalization began to gain 
acceptance in the leadership’s ideological thinking, the reforms stopped short of political 
liberalization: the fundamental political control of the party and the role of the state was 
not subject to change. For some other groups in the party leadership, Doi Moi meant 
above all an effort to combat political and economic dependence on foreign powers. The 
view was that no amount of aid could substitute for national independence, and that 
“…the history of economic dependence should not be repeated …. Development must be 
gained and sustained by internal strength”, as noted by the interviewed government 
officials.  
  3Given the lessons from the relationship with the Soviet Union, the party developed the 
view that the state should manage its internal and external relations in a way that could 
clearly separate between domestic politics and areas where external involvement could be 
allowed. Domestic economic policy came to be dominated by a concern for national 
security, under which all other policies were subsumed, in particular foreign policy. This 
caution with respect to external partners was retained for a long time after the 
introduction of Doi Moi, and was manifested e.g. as a fear that foreign assistance could 
be used as a tool of external influence in Vietnam’s domestic affairs.  
For some time after the beginning of the reform program, economic integration and 
engagement with the West were still officially viewed as “social evils” (quoted in Sidel 
1998, p.80) and therefore had to be fully controlled by the state. The attitude to foreign 
donors was skeptical, in particular regarding discussions about democracy and human 
rights, on the one hand, and promotion of the private sector and civil society, on the other 
hand. The development of these domestic issues was not considered to be in the interest 
of the state, but they were quite often included among the donors’ main objectives. The 
rule that guided the government’s relationship with external actors was, therefore, an aim 
for “self-determined integration, bringing into play the nation’s internal forces and taking 
most advantage of integration in order to strengthen effectiveness of international 
cooperation, ensuring independence and ownership as well as national interests…” (See 
Central Party Committee’s Resolution 2001, p.3). 
External relations and foreign aid since the early 1990s 
Although the past history of war and economic dependence on foreign countries initially 
colored the party’s and government’s policies towards external actors, these policies were 
gradually revised as a result of the changing international environment. Economic and 
political dependence was still to be avoided, but excessive caution and skepticism 
regarding the outside world was not consistent with international integration. Hence, the 
policies were adjusted to balance the economic and political incentives for integration 
with the need for political independence: both objectives were to taken into account in the 
development of relationships with external actors, e.g. aid donors and regional and 
multilateral organizations.  
After the introduction of Doi Moi and the improvement in foreign relations following the 
retreat from Cambodia, Vietnam aimed to increase its integration with the world 
economy. Cooperation with the West was emerging as a necessity for improving 
economic performance. A new diplomatic policy was adopted, with encouraging results. 
The US embargo was lifted and the diplomatic relations with the US were normalized in 
1994, with a further deepening of the relations in 2000, when a Bilateral Trade 
Agreement was signed. Trade with the US has expanded rapidly as a result of these 
measures. Vietnam was admitted to ASEAN and APEC in 1995. That year, Vietnam also 
applied for membership in the WTO.  
In the field of development assistance, several of the major international donors resumed 
their official cooperation with Vietnam in 1993. Vietnam’s role as an aid recipient was 
initially colored by the concerns and worries inherited from the pre-Doi Moi period, but 
  4the relations with the donor community have changed substantially since that time. 
Moreover, the relations with the donor community have contributed to important changes 
in Vietnamese society, not least regarding the role of the state. The Vietnamese 
leadership saw the reappearance of aid from major multilateral and bilateral donors in 
1993 as a token of political recognition from the West for the reform initiatives and the 
open-door policy launched in 1986. Over the years, the party and its government have 
learned to engage in a dialogue with donors regarding the implementation of 
development policies, although the emphasis on autonomy and national control remains 
at the policy level. This change has been expressed by some government officials as 
follows: “...just the fact that we have worked with donors and the management of foreign 
aid has opened our views, judgments and sharpened our knowledge. We have learned to 
be open and it enables us to trust… The question is how to take the best advantage of 
foreign assistance without making Vietnam dependent on it”. 
Most of the donors represented in Vietnam today entered after the reforms initiated by the 
Vietnamese leadership had led to a strong upturn in the economy. This is important for 
Vietnam’s relations to donors. It implies that foreign aid was not the initial driver of the 
economic boom. It is also important that the domestically driven reforms resulted in rapid 
economic growth that enabled Vietnam to avoid taking on substantial amounts of foreign 
debt. These factors have strengthened Vietnam’s bargaining position and differentiate the 
country from many other aid recipients and their relations to donors: the Vietnamese 
government has a higher degree of control over its own national reforms and 
development planning. In many cases, it has meant that the government has rejected 
development projects where a donor’s policies and aid disbursements were tied to strong 
political or economic conditions.  
This notwithstanding, the government has come to realize that foreign aid has played an 
important role that could not have been substituted by other kinds of external relations 
(MPI 2004; GoV 1999; GoV 2004). In the new era of development cooperation with 
many different donors, the government has learned to maximize the support to various 
development programs in Vietnam while maintaining reform autonomy and the initiative 
in policy making. Long term cooperation with bilateral donors like Sweden and 
multilateral donor like UNDP has shown that a relationship of mutual trust can yield very 
good results. During the period 1986-1992, aid from these and a small number of other 
donors accounted for only about 1 percent of GDP (MPI 2004). Nevertheless, their 
choice to stay and support Vietnam at a time when all other donors left or imposed 
sanctions gave them a special status as long-term partners and trusted friends. Today, 
these donors no longer play any dominant role, since other international financial 
institutions and bilateral donors have entered with larger financial resources. However, 
the government still relies on these long-term partners to open doors for development 
cooperation in politically sensitive areas, such as anti-corruption programs, parliamentary 
democracy, and public administration reforms. Hence, aid has not only been used for 
large-scale infrastructure development, but also for policy and institutional reforms at 
both the central and provincial levels, often with the foreign partner chosen explicitly on 
the basis of its competence and capacity. The emergence of these kinds of “sensitive” 
development projects clearly indicates a change in the attitudes towards foreign aid and 
the relations with foreign donors. It is recognized that the roles and interests of each 
  5individual donor differ, as does their potential contribution to Vietnamese development. 
Therefore, “adaptive” rather than “cautious” is a more appropriate characterization of the 
government’s new policy in its donor relations.  
The more adaptive and dynamic relations with a wide variety of foreign development 
partners make it possible to be flexible regarding the national security concerns. This has 
allowed the donors to broaden their support from infrastructure to policy reform and it 
has also allowed Vietnam to speed up its integration with the world economy. Preserving 
national interests and independence remain important objectives, but they do not seem to 
make up serious obstacles to constructive development cooperation anymore.  
The following two parts discuss the interaction between the government and the donor 
community and the institutional setting for foreign aid during the past two decades. The 
focus is on the process of change, and in particular how the institutional setting for ODA 
has developed through the interactions between the Vietnamese government and the 
donor community.  
3. Centrally planned development policy  
As an inheritance from the pre-Doi Moi period, the government had a strong ambition to 
control its domestic politics and it was cautious towards the new external partners that 
began to arrive to Vietnam after the late 1980s. Central planning was the fundamental 
institutional tool of the government to manage and regulate socio-economic development. 
The system of central planning resulted in an institutional set-up in which the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment (MPI) stood – and continues to stand – at the centre of the 
country’s overall development planning. In this central role, MPI drafted and formulated 
the overall national development strategies and short-term plans, and it held the main 
responsibility for the management of public investment and resource allocation.
2 Because 
of this central coordination role, MPI was seen as the government’s “conductor of the 
whole development concert”, in which the musical players in the orchestra were inputs 
from different ministries. MPI’s officials considered its main task to be “Can bang cac 
muc tieu chinh phu va hai hoa cac loi ich”: to pursue the government’s development 
priorities and to balance stakeholder interests between sectoral and regional concerns, as 
well as between national and international actors. MPI therefore played a decisive role in 
overall supervision and coordination with other ministries and provinces: it was 
responsible for providing national development objectives, budgeting and guidelines for 
provinces and sectors, collecting national and external resources for local and sectoral 
development, mobilizing and approving ODA and FDI projects, and monitoring the 
implementation of development strategies and the utilization of ODA and FDI.  
The central role played by MPI in this specific setting is, in most other countries, partly in 
the domain of the Ministry of Finance (MoF). In Vietnam, the concentration of power to 
MPI was partly mandated by the ambition to continue planning economic development in 
                                                 
2 These functions were managed by the State Planning Committee (SPC) before the establishment of the 
Ministry of Planning and Investment.  While MPI is the government’s main actor in the economic domain, 
there are other institutions for other strategic issues, e.g. national security and foreign policy. 
  6spite of the increasing market orientation, and partly the result of a wish to separate two 
functions related to public expenditure management. MPI was in charge of the 
management of public investment, including planning of public investment policies and 
priorities, while MoF held the executive role in current public finance. This institutional 
structure allowed MPI to control the drafting of the national Socio-Economic 
Development Plans (SEDPs) and the management of public investment. For instance, 
MPI was responsible for the five-year Public Investment Programs (PIPs) and their 
budget allocations. The PIPs are lists of projects that reflect the government’s investment 
policies and priorities. One consequence of this division of responsibilities was a “dual” 
budgeting system, where MPI and its departments of planning and investment at the 
provincial level prepared the investment budget including capital expenditures and donor-
funded projects, while MoF and its departments of finance at the provincial level 
prepared the fiscal framework and the estimates of current expenditure. Hence, there was 
no unified budget until at a very late stage of the planning process, which created 
problems for the coordination and the management of the state budget at central and 
provincial levels, as well as across sectors: not surprisingly, this fragmentation was 
heavily criticized by the donor community (WB 2005, pp.50-52).  
Managing ODA in development planning 
The integration of ODA into the national overall development plans was part of this 
institutional set-up.
3  The unit within MPI that was given responsibility for ODA 
management was the Foreign Economic Relations Department (FERD). This 
organization coordinated ODA resources at the national level, including negotiating and 
supervising the allocation of funds to most ODA programs. In particular, FERD managed 
large-scale and capital-intensive loan projects. Based on the objectives outlined in the 
SEDP and the PIP, FERD prepared a priority list of national projects calling for ODA 
investment during the current five-year planning period. This priority list was used as an 
“investment menu” for donors to select projects for their development cooperation. In 
this setting, it was clear that donors were expected to conform to Vietnam’s development 
plans and operate within the framework given by the set menu. Several donors 
approached by the authors report that they were typically presented with a limited set of 
alternative from which to select cooperation programs. However, the selection criteria 
and selection procedures for MPI’s priority lists (the PIP and ODA project lists) were 
unknown to both donors and local stakeholders. In some cases, this resulted in the 
selection of projects that appeared to be inconsistent with the development priorities 
expressed in the SEDP and other official documents (WB 2005).  
This centralized system arguably constrained the dynamism of provincial development 
and the economic autonomy and accountability of local authorities. The government and 
line-ministries were able to exercise a system where they planned, steered and controlled 
                                                 
3 Where ODA is involved, MPI has taken the leading role despite the existing ODA coordinating agencies 
that consist of MPI, State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Ministry of 
Finance (MoF), and the Office of the Government (OOG). In this structure, SBV has been the signatory of 
agreements with multilateral financial institutions such as WB, IMF and ADB. MoF has held responsibility 
for monitoring the flow of funds and controlling disbursement and payment practices. MoFA was expected 
to use its diplomatic tools to promote ODA mobilization, and arguably played a more symbolic role. 
  7local governments through the provision of public services (e.g. education, health-care, 
culture, and sport) and infrastructure (e.g. schools and hospitals) (Thang 2004, pp.5-6). It 
also created a framework where MPI was at the center of a system characterized as 
“giving and asking for”, which refers to the decisions related to budget allocation and 
project approvals. David Dapice (2002) argues that with central planning, aid became a 
strongly politicized process, where provinces had to turn to Hanoi in order to convince 
MPI that their development projects were of higher priority than others, and that they 
should be included in the priority lists presented to donors. One consequence of this aid 
bargaining systems was that many provinces focused mainly on how to get a larger share 
of the aid budget rather than how to create sound conditions for attracting private 
investors.  
At the same time, it was clear that the central position of MPI was instrumental in 
creating strong ownership of the development agenda. The institutional set-up allowed 
the state to regulate not only domestic development planning, but also the allocation of 
aid and the relations with donors. If donor and aid management had been outside the 
body responsible for national economic planning, it would undoubtedly have been more 
difficult to align aid flows with Vietnamese development priorities. 
One consequence of the centralization of the ODA management was that the allocation of 
resources was biased towards the areas preferred by MPI. The resulting distribution of aid 
was unbalanced both in terms of regions and sectors. Vietnam’s Public Expenditure 
Review (WB 2005) notes that public investment projects included in the PIPs and ODA 
priority lists reflected the government’s priority to generate economic growth, and the 
resources for investments were consequently directed towards the richer cities/provinces 
where the conditions for further growth were more favorable. Only limited aid resources 
were allocated directly to provinces during the 1990s. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
Northern Central Coast and Mekong Delta regions, which exhibited the highest poverty 
rates, received only a small share of total aid. Much larger amounts of ODA were 
allocated to relatively wealthy provinces including the regions surrounding Hanoi and 
HCMC. The lack of concern for regional disparities arguably resulted in increased 
inequality between provinces (WB 2005, pp.131–132, Nguyen, B.A 2004, UNDP 2005). 
Similarly, investments for poverty reduction and social development were not given the 
same priority as investments focusing on generating economic growth. Throughout the 
1990s, aid was concentrated to prioritize growth infrastructure (Nguyen, Q.T 2002, GoV 
1999; GoV 2004). For instance, examining the government’s 1993 priority list of 
candidate projects presented to donors, Pham (1996) demonstrated the government’s 
focus on large-scale infrastructure. The energy and transport sectors accounted for 70 
percent of total the financial requirements for infrastructure projects, while investments 
for other areas such as social or rural development were very modest (Pham 1996, pp.90-
91). Within the large-scale infrastructure field, there was a shift from water and sanitation 
in the early 1990s to energy in 1996-2000, and further to transportation infrastructure 
since 2001. The investments to social areas were mainly funded through separate national 
target programs (NTPs) established in the early 1990s (e.g. Programs 135 and Program 
143). It is likely that other institutional structures for ODA administrations would have 
resulted in a different set of priorities for the use of external aid resources. For instance, 
  8the share of social programs would probably have been larger if the ODA priority lists 
had been prepared by the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA), 
or in a structure where several different ministries had been jointly responsible for setting 
the priorities.  
4. A changing role for the government  
Decentralization and institutional change  
The institutional structure where development planning and aid management were 
strongly centralized to MPI has slowly begun to change during the last few years. These 
changes are part of a decentralization process that is largely driven by the continuing 
economic reform process (not least the integration with the international economy) but it 
is also encouraged and influenced by the donor community. There is still some internal 
opposition against decentralization, as parts of the government and some line ministries 
are reluctant to give up central planning in favor of a more market-oriented decision 
making process, where other actors such as provincial authorities, public interest groups, 
and business groups can be strategically included in development planning. However, it 
has proved impossible to maintain full control at the center and to achieve the desired 
internationalization and diversification of the economy at the same time. These on-going 
changes are clearly reflected in the changes in the role of MPI and its power relationships 
with other national stakeholders 
A first indication of these changes is the increasing prominence of the National Assembly. 
There are signs that some of the power of the 15-member Politburo has slowly begun to 
shift towards the National Assembly. Traditionally, the role of the National Assembly 
was largely to approve the legislative agenda of the VCP, transforming party politics into 
national law. Now, it is increasingly taking on the role as the nation’s highest decision-
making body, and is becoming more active in overseeing the state’s activities.
4  
Secondly, the general trend of decentralization has recently been institutionalized in a 
number of government resolutions and decrees. The most explicit legislation is found in a 
resolution where the government assigns provincial authorities to participate in the 
decentralization of six areas of decision-making and power relationships: (i) planning, 
plan and development investment; (ii) budget and finance; (iii) public assets, land and 
natural resources; (iv) management of state owned enterprises; (v) management of public 
service delivery; and (vi) organization and personnel (MPI 2004).
5 The 2002 State 
Budget Law that came into force in 2004 is another legislative cornerstone. It provides 
guidelines for how to manage decentralization, give institutional accountability and new 
power to the provincial people’s councils, and define the roles and responsibilities of 
central and sub-national authorities of government (WB 2005, pp. 47-48). The law also 
defines a more balanced distribution of power between MPI and MoF, in which MoF 
becomes the lead ministry responsible for fiscal planning, budget formulation, and debt 
                                                 
4 See Resolution No 51/2001/QH.  
5 Resolution No 08/2004/NQ-CP on “Continued Acceleration of State Management Decentralization 
between the Central Government and Centrally-run Provincial Governments”, issued 30 June 2004.  
  9management, while MPI remains the lead ministry for capital budget formulation.
6 This 
clearly requires better coordination between the two ministries. One interesting 
development is that several districts have established formal collaboration between the 
planning and finance functions through the creation of combined Departments of 
Planning and Finance (WB 2005, pp.120). So far, the same degree of coordination has 
not been achieved at the provincial and national levels.  
Other crucial legal and institutional changes have been introduced through several 
decrees on decentralization in the area of investment.
7 With the exception of a few 
National Projects that require ratification by the National Assembly (such as the 5-million 
hectare aforestation program, the Dung Quat Oil Refinery project, the Ho Chi Minh 
Highway, the Son La Hydropower plan, and other similar ventures) public investment 
projects are classified in three groups: A, B, and C. Group A comprises the largest 
projects in terms of financial investment and national priorities. Categories B and C 
include projects that are smaller or of primarily local significance. The Prime Minister 
approves the National Projects, while sectoral ministries and provincial people committee 
chairmen can directly approve investment for A, B, and C-graded projects.
8 Since 
investment category A has the highest economic importance, the provincial authorities 
and sectoral ministries need to consult with the Ministry of Construction prior to making 
an approval decision. At the district levels, the people committee’s chairmen are allowed 
to approve investment projects with total investment capital of less than VND 3 billion 
(about USD 200,000). Commune People Committee’s chairmen have the authority to 
approve projects with investment capital of less than VND 1 billion (about USD 70,000 
USD) (Nguyen, T.N. 2004, p.11). 
In line with this decentralization of public investment decisions, provincial authorities 
have also gained more autonomy regarding decisions involving external resources, like 
FDI and ODA.
9 Regarding ODA-funded projects, the Prime Minister approves A-graded 
projects including budget support projects, national projects, and inter-sectoral and inter-
regional projects. The Prime Minister’s approval is also required for technical assistance 
projects with total investment capital of USD 1 million or more. Meanwhile, approvals of 
B and C-graded projects and technical assistance projects with total capital of less than 
USD 1 million are decentralized to heads of line ministries and provincial people 
committees (MPI 2001). Other institutional reforms under the umbrella of a Public 
Administration Reform (PAR) program lend further support to the decentralization 
                                                 
6 MPI retains the responsibility to submit to the government the draft plan on socio-economic development 
of the whole country, and the major balances of the national economy, which serve as the basis for the 
financial and budgetary plans. Still, with the various supplementary government Decrees to guide the 
implementation of the Budget Law and the Government Resolution 08 on decentralization, the role of MoF 
is clearly becoming stronger. 
7 See Government Decrees No. 52/1990, No. 12/2000, and No. 07/2003. 
8 There are some exceptions to this generalization. 10 out of 64 provinces are managed directly under the 
central authority, and approval from the Prime Minister is needed for all large projects in these provinces. 
Similarly, a few strategically important sectors’ development plans also require the Prime Minister’s 
approval. 
9 In ODA management, Decree 17/2001/ND-CP serves as the main regulation. Recently, the PM has 
required MPI to amend this decree to make it harmonize with other decrees in decentralization in 
management and investment (Resolution 08/2004 and Decree 07/2003). 
  10process. Much of the PAR process is focused on assisting participatory development 
planning, budgeting and investment management capacity at various local levels. Similar 
decentralization has taken place in the management of FDI capital (GTZ & CIEM 2004). 
Although the decentralization process has grown stronger over time, it has not been 
seamless. One of the main problems has been the lack of capacity at the provincial level 
for local development planning, budgeting, and investment management.  Moreover, the 
accountability and responsibility of local authorities as owners of public investment is 
unclear. There is no comprehensive system for investment monitoring and inspection. 
These conditions arguably create substantial risks related to corruption and 
mismanagement (Nguyen, T.N 2004). Hence, although local authorities have been eager 
to promote decentralization, there are well-founded reasons to be cautious and to focus 
explicitly on strengthening provincial and regional management capability. The donor 
community has been an important actor in promoting the necessary capacity development.  
MPI the intermediator 
The concentration of power to the center did not only constrain the dynamism of 
provincial development and the economic autonomy and accountability of local 
authorities, but it also created other problems. For example, considering the lack of 
transparency regarding the criteria and processes for the identification of priority 
investments in the PIP and the ODA priority lists, there were reasons to worry about how 
efficiently this power was exercised and whether there was a risk for corruption. The 
dominance of MPI also created a strong bias towards physical investment and economic 
growth, with much less attention to social issues and “pro-poor” expenditures than what 
most donors desired.  
It is therefore not surprising that the role of MPI has begun to change in line with the 
overall trend towards decentralization (MPI 2004, GTZ & CIEM 2004) Although MPI 
maintains a strong position when it comes to development planning, it’s role regarding 
concrete ODA projects is shifting from one of control and implementation to one of 
intermediation. Traditionally, MPI and various sector ministries were responsible for 
establishing the allocative norms for the budget and provincial authorities needed to 
follow this. Since the introduction of the 2002 state budget law, financial norms are made 
public and only used to determine the total amount to be transferred to sub-national levels 
of government. Provincial people committees have the right to decide about the detailed 
allocation of resources in their jurisdiction. The increasing autonomy of provinces has 
undermined the traditional role of sector ministries, who can no longer control sector 
expenditures at the provincial level (WB 2005, pp. 57-120). 
The legal and institutional reforms discussed above have paved the way for donors and 
provincial authorities to expand their collaboration on various ODA investment projects. 
MPI is still in charge of the supervision and management of investment projects in 
category A, which are considered to be of strategic importance for national development, 
but the other two categories of investment projects and most technical assistance projects 
are managed by provincial governments. Hence, donors do not have to spend time and 
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directly with provincial and local authorities.  
The decentralization has also improved the transparency regarding investment priorities. 
Earlier, MPI’s selection procedures were essentially unknown to outsiders, but now MPI 
consults with donors at Consultative Group meetings (CG) before submitting the list of 
priority projects to the Prime Minister for approval. This part of the decentralization 
process reflects both a concern for economic efficiency as well as the changing attitude 
towards donors, who are no longer seen as any direct threat to national sovereignty. On 
the contrary, the government now invites donors to establish development cooperation at 
the provincial level, with particular focus on building capacity for local authorities in 
order to facilitate further decentralization. It can already bee seen that those provinces 
that have benefited more from decentralized ODA have also developed stronger local 
capacity (See GTZ & CIEM 2004). Roughly 25 percent of total ODA funds and 72 
percent of projects are now managed by provincial authorities and line ministries (UNDP 
2005).  
One important consequence of the closer contacts between donors and provincial 
authorities and line ministries is that aid resources have become more closely integrated 
with domestic budget management. There is a clear trend away from projects that are 
funded almost exclusively by donors – which can be run separately from the provincial 
and central budgets – to projects that are co-financed with local resources. This trend has 
been supported by the 2002 State Budget Law and the decrees on decentralization 
mentioned above, as well as decrees on Grassroots Democracy. This shift is also 
beginning to change the sectoral distribution of ODA funds. For example, the recently 
launched Poverty Reduction Support Credit programs are largely based on direct contacts 
between foreign donors and provincial authorities, including many of the poor and 
remote provinces. These programs cover a wide range of pro-poor expenditures towards 
rural development projects from energy transmission to policy institutional support, with 
the exact content determined on the basis of the specific priorities of donors and 
provincial beneficiaries. The likely outcome is an increase in spending on social 
programs focusing on poverty reduction at the expense of large-scale infrastructure.  
The institutional changes in development planning and management reflect some of the 
impact that the donor community has exercized in Vietnam: individual donors have been 
arguing for decentralization for a long time, and this pressure has probably had more than 
just a marginal impact in promoting the changes in the Vietnamese planning system. 
Donors have been interested in supporting decentralization and public administration 
reforms at both the central and provincial levels. This has occurred with the full 
knowledge that the institutional capacity of provinces and districts is weak. Therefore, 
ODA projects have systematically included components aiming to improve the 
management capacity of local authorities, with notable success. The improvements at the 
local level that have been achieved through collaboration with foreign donors have 
arguably made it possible to raise the objectives regarding decentralization in general. 
One reason why this has been accepted at the central level is probably the trust that has 
developed after two decades of development cooperation. Another reason is that it has 
proved impossible to isolate the donor community from the Vietnamese society at large. 
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have created domestic interest groups that have contributed to the changes in the 
Vietnamese institutional framework. This is illustrated in the discussion of the CPRGS 
that follows in the next sub-section. 
The Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy 
The case of CPRGS illustrates some of the relations between the government, here acting 
as the controller of development policy decision-making, and international donors, 
exerting external pressure on the domestic decision-making process. It also illustrates 
how the activities of foreign donors have led to the creation of domestic interest groups 
that contribute to changing the Vietnamese institutional framework from within. 
The intended framework 
In the current international development policy debate that puts priority on poverty 
reduction, the multilateral development agencies (the World Bank and IMF) request 
countries to produce a poverty reduction strategy, summarized in a Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP), to qualify for development aid. This initiative was led by the 
multilaterals and launched in 1999 as a way to restructure relationships between donors 
and recipient countries (Conway 2004, p.1). The political objectives embedded in the 
PRSP process aimed towards: (i) Shifting the focus of the government’s accountability 
for poverty reduction from external donors to citizens; (ii) Enhancing public participation 
in policy formulation; and (iii) Encouraging a mode of policy-making in which 
accountability is related to poverty reduction outcomes, rather than the delivery of direct 
benefits to particular social groups.  
At this time, Vietnam had achieved remarkable successes in combating poverty and was 
widely recognized as a development “success story” in comparison with other low-
income countries (Conway 2004; IMF 2004). When the PRSP concept was introduced, 
the Vietnamese government was focused on the preparation of its own five and ten-year 
strategies and plans. These policy documents summarized the government’s development 
policy framework, laying out the long-term development vision and action plans. Yet, 
there had been concern among both domestic and foreign development planners that 
these documents focused too much on the party’s and government’s political ambitions 
and ideologies. Appropriate development plans were expected to have more concrete 
objectives and budgetary targets as well as roadmaps for implementation than what could 
be found in these documents. In this situation, it suited the government’s diverse interests 
to produce a Vietnamese PRSP. One motive was to sustain lucrative development 
assistance relationships with the international financial institutions and secure access to 
concessional loans. Another motivation was the insight of Vietnamese development 
policy planners that such a policy document could help concretize and realize the 
government development plans. At the same time, it was not politically convenient for 
the government to replace the five and ten-year plans by a policy framework made up of 
donor-imposed ideas. To fully adapt the domestic development policy to a whole new 
development concept introduced by external donors would also imply changing the 
existing model of development planning. Given the existing institutional setting and 
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motives and possibilities to create a fairly flexible system for exercising power and 
keeping donors under the principle of national ownership.  
In mid-2000, the government therefore launched its own PRSP process and the final 
product became the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (CPRGS) in 
May 2002. It reflected a “Vietnamese approach” to the PRSP concept introduced by the 
international financial institutions. Having the document prepared in Vietnamese, 
Vietnam differs from many other countries where the PRSP has been drafted in English 
with substantial influence from international consultants (Conway 2004; Ohno and Ohno 
2005). Even though draft versions were translated into English for international 
comments, the process was conducted in Vietnamese for the national audience. The 
document was drafted by an inter-ministerial committee led by the Chairman of the 
Department of National Economic Issues within MPI (the department that also prepares 
the PIPs). The committee gathered 52 representatives from 16 ministries and national 
agencies.. Four regional workshops were arranged for consultation with the public to get 
inputs to the policy documents. Donors were invited to make comments during the 
different rounds of the drafting process. 
The Vietnamese version of the PRSP put economic growth and poverty reduction as the 
two main pillars of development: this also reflects the Vietnamese government’s basic 
attitudes regarding strategies to promote development and tackling the country’s growing 
social problems. Three broad objectives were defined in the CPRGS: 
1.  High growth through a transition to a market economy. This lays out the 
government’s agenda for structural reform and concrete plans for the implementation 
of the transition. 
2.  An equitable, socially inclusive, and sustainable pattern of growth. This is embedded 
in the detailed plans for implementing sectoral and social policies. 
3.  Adopting modern public administration, legal, and governance systems. This goal 
aims to facilitate the design and implementation of policies and programs necessary 
to attain the first two goals. 
The CPRGS was composed by drawing together different components from the existing 
sectoral plans and adding the poverty reduction elements. The leader of the drafting 
committee, Dr Cao Viet Sinh, identified five ways in which the CPRGS would add to 
existing plans and strategies: (1) CPRGS defines time-bound structural reforms and 
actions that will help reaching the targets in the five-year action plan, (2) all participants 
in the drafting process will improve their understanding of how to effectively harness 
economic growth to reduce poverty, (3) CPRGS includes an accountability framework, 
clear targets and intermediate indicators improving the capacity to measure progress, (4) 
CPRGS improves the poverty impacts of public expenditure and investment, and (5) 
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effectiveness and quality of ODA delivered to Vietnam.
10  
Inside the government, some stakeholders initially saw the CPRGS as an external 
document and were generally reluctant to let external actors set the agenda for Vietnam. 
In the initial drafting process, they therefore remained rather passive, and saw the process 
primarily as a way for the government to maintain access to lucrative aid. On the other 
hand, they also realized along the process that they could benefit from ODA by 
integrating their sectoral interests into the CPRGS. Gradually it became clear that it 
would not require very much effort to formulate a development strategy with a focus on 
poverty by integrating components of various existing overall and cross-sectoral 
strategies into the CPRGS. The adoption of the CPRGS thus became both a way to meet 
external demands and a way to address some ministerial economic demands, according to 
some ministerial representatives in the drafting committee.  
The CPRGS was initially seen by donors and actors outside the government as a 
supplementary development document complementing existing strategies and plans. 
There were reasons for them to believe so. By the time the CPRGS had been produced, it 
mainly outlined various development objectives but without any budget allocations. This 
meant that there was no incentive for the government to change the old structure of using 
the SEDP as the main guide for budget allocation and investment. The CPRGS was 
instead a guide for the utilization ODA resources. Given the parallel existence of these 
two strands of development planning, the CPRGS was almost unknown to provincial and 
local authorities. For provincial and local authorities, the main budget resources were 
drawn from the government budget, and there, the important guidelines were the SEDPs 
including the PIPs. As a result, the social policies and poverty reduction programs 
targeted by the CPRGS ran the risk of being seen as marginal activities in comparison 
with alternative core priorities included in the SEDP and the PIPs. These were largely 
focused on construction and industry in areas that were already relatively wealthier (IMF 
2004; WB 2005).  
Concerning budgeting, the CPRGS indicated that donors were expected to put funds into 
the CPRGS while the government invested in the five-year action plan. At the same time, 
sectoral ministries did not classify expenditures that were to be financed from ODA 
resource according to the standard budget codes, making it difficult for donors to follow 
up how their funds were integrated in overall public expenditure. This structure was 
largely contrary to donor arguments asserting that aid funding had to be accompanied by 
recipient funding in a cooperative manner. Consequently, the donor community wanted 
to see the CPRGS more strongly linked to national development planning and funding, i.e. 
integrated with the SEDP and the PIP. However, for the Vietnamese government, the 
SEDP was the primary policy document: covering not only economics but also political 
issues and security matters, it was considered to be outside the domain where external 
interests and funds could be used. Therefore, CPRGS could initially only be used to 
                                                 
10 Dr Cao Viet Sinh, is presently Vice Minister of MPI after serving as Director of the National Economic 
Issues (MPI).  
  15define development objectives, while the mainstream instruments had to be used for 
actual implementation.  
Unintended outcomes  
In the few years that have passed since the introduction of the first CPRGS, its role and 
character have already changed.  
Firstly, in an updated version of the strategy formulated in 2003, new objectives have 
been added to the three main goals identified in CPRGS 2002. According to the revised 
CPRGS document in 2003, the eight broad objectives for the country’s socio-economic 
development for the period up to 2010 are to: 
(i)  Promote rapid and sustainable economic growth coupled with attainment of 
social progress and equity. 
(ii)  Create and equal business environment for all types of enterprises from all 
economic sectors. 
(iii)  Continue with structural reforms to bring about a transformation of the 
nation’s economic structure. This objective includes further integration with 
the international economy and strengthening the competitiveness of 
Vietnamese industries. 
(iv)  Provide poor households with opportunities to raise their income by 
accelerating broad-based growth of agriculture, industry, and services. 
(v)  Encourage human development and reduce inequality. 
(vi)  Solve the particular problems of urban poverty with regard to employment, 
income, and housing. 
(vii)  Develop and expand social protection and safety net for the poor. 
(viii)  Undertake public administration reform. 
 
Hence, the revision, there is clearly a stronger emphasis on equity and social issues, 
although economic growth remains the prime objective. As a result of this, the pattern of 
ODA utilization has begun to change. Firstly, there has been a reduction in the share of 
large-scale infrastructure, as well as an increase in the share of funds directed directly to 
provinces. Policy and institutional support have emerged among the biggest aid sectors, 
with economic management and administration development as the core sub-sectors. Pro-
poor spending, including projects focusing on education, health, and area development, 
has also increased 
Secondly, there are changes in the relations between the government and its foreign 
development partners. From the government side, major reforms are reshaping the 
institutional setting for development policy and investment planning. Regarding the 
donor community, both the international financial institutions and many bilateral donors 
have an interest in playing a greater role in the Vietnamese policy debate. The process 
that is underway entails an integration of the ideas embedded in the PRSP/CPRGS into 
the planning of the next SEDP and its subsequent implementation.  
At the policy level, the Vietnamese government has begun to see the CPRGS as an action 
plan translating sectoral strategies into concrete cross-sectoral action plans with an 
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11 This view was strengthened in 2003 when, 
based on a Japanese initiative (Ohno and Ohno 2005, p.3), the final revision of the 
CPRGS document came to include also large-scale infrastructure. As the largest donor in 
Vietnam, Japan arguably wields more influence than other donors (especially when 
Japanese views do not clash with the Vietnamese government’s main priorities). The 
government also wants to take advantage of Japan’s interests in promoting growth. The 
inclusion of large-scale infrastructure in the CPRGS establishes a concrete link between 
growth promotion strategies and poverty reduction targets. As a result, the final CPRGS 
document now includes all major policy areas related to comprehensive growth and it can 
therefore no longer be seen mainly as a social policy document.  
Therefore, the government has integrated the core components of the CPRGS into the 
current five-year plan for 2006-2010. The Prime Minister’s Directive 33, issued in 
September 2004, initiated the preparation of the 2006-2010 SEDP, calling for a more 
open and participatory planning process than for earlier long-term plans. It also 
encouraged planning agencies to formulate strategies that put more focus on desired 
outcomes – both in terms of poverty reduction and growth – rather than input targets 
(WB 2005, p.55). This indicated that the new SEDP would contain a partly new set of 
policy objectives, which, in turn, required changes in the process of planning public 
investment. In fact, Vietnam’s annual progress report on CPRGS (IMF 2004) and 
Vietnam’s latest public expenditure review (WB 2005) both concluded that there was 
already an increasing emphasis on “pro-poor” investment as a result of these incipient 
changes. New pro-poor targets have been added to the PIP and the criteria for public 
investment allocation have been adjusted to reflect the policy objectives included in the 
CPRGS.  
One of the main institutional reforms is the establishment of an inter-ministerial working 
group to develop Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs) at the sectoral level. 
This working group matches investment priorities and financial resource in a process that 
brings together senior officials from both MPI and MoF. Pilot MTEFs have been 
launched in four sectors and four provinces. The MTEFs aim primarily at (i) abolishing 
dual budgeting, and creating a consistent and realistic resource framework with balance 
between capital and recurrent expenditure; (ii) improving the allocation of resources 
between and within sectors by building budgets around a single, consistent, and realistic 
set of policy objectives; and (iii) providing sectoral ministries and provinces a hard 
budget constraint and increased autonomy in order to increase incentives for efficient and 
effective use of funds (WB 2005). The CPRGS and the MTEFs can be seen as 
illustrations of the new strategic priorities and integrated approaches to development 
planning and investment in Vietnam. 
Since the CPRGS was initially meant as a guide for the external funding of public 
investment, donors were encouraged to align their ODA funds with the CPRGS. However, 
ODA funds were not included in the mainstream budget, which was based on the SEDP. 
                                                 
11 Conway (2004) notes that a cross-sectoral development plan with focus on poverty reduction was 
initiated by Ho Chi Minh City already in the mid-1990s. This subsequently resulted in the national Hunger 
Eradiation and Poverty Reduction (HEPR) Program, which was treated as a social policy program and was 
separated from the general development goals prior to the existence of CPRGS.  
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strong incentives to integrate components of the CPRGS into their regular activities in 
order to secure additional funding from ODA. The incentive structure, therefore, made it 
hard to keep the two financing systems apart, especially when more funds were 
committed for the national poverty reduction program outside the standard budgeting 
system. Interviews with ministerial representatives involved in the drafting committee 
suggest that some provinces were particularly successful in taking advantage of these 
opportunities, as well as their entitlements to extra funding from the National Targeted 
Program 135. This implies that strong government ownership at the policy level may well 
coexist with a situation where both national and international actors are intensively 
involved at various levels of the implementation process, influencing the ultimate 
outcome. It also suggests that the CPRGS and the SEDP probably need to be integrated 
even closer in the future. In fact, in the planning and content preparation of the 2006-
2010 SEDP, the government circulated drafts for discussion to donors and non-state 
stakeholders, such as the research community, NGOs and representatives of the private 
sector. This new way of preparing the development plans may be a way to combine the 
growth and poverty reduction objectives. Yet, while the integration of CPRGS 
components into the SEDP may work in the short run, it also raises the question to what 
extent economic planning can be combined with the development of an internationalized 
and market oriented economy in the longer run.  
Summarizing the effects of the CPRGS on the Vietnamese policy framework, it is 
possible to make a few generalizations regarding the role of foreign donors for the 
country’s structural reforms. A first observation is that CPRGS has had an influence on 
the domestic politics of development planning and the process of policy making. If 
Vietnam had been more passive and allowed external actors to formulate a poverty 
reduction strategy along the standard PRSP programs, it would probably have been a 
marginal product. The incentives would have been directed towards keeping such a 
concept as isolated as possible in order to ensure national security and sovereignty. With 
the creation of the CPRGS, Vietnam instead took the lead and directed the formulation of 
the strategy, thereby avoiding a defensive position and instead creating a strategy that 
was largely accepted not only by donors and the international community but also 
domestically. The recent decision to integrate the SEDP and the CPRGS is likely to 
reinforce the importance of the CPRGS. Furthermore, Vietnam has come to appreciate 
the praise that CPRGS has been given internationally. Clearly, the fact that Vietnam is 
often lauded in international discussions about development and ownership has made the 
CPRGS better known domestically and given it a higher status. Hence, the CPRGS has 
become a natural part of development politics in Vietnam, even though this may not have 
been the intention. 
A second observation is that the new framework has also opened new ways for (i) 
development planning, (ii) policy making and implementation and (iii) resource 
allocation. 
(i) In comparison with the preparation and formulation of earlier SEDPs, the process 
leading up to the CPRGS has been substantially more transparent and participatory. 
Government officials have found that the approach used in preparing the CPRGS could 
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concentration on political “hardcore” objectives and reformed development policy 
planning. The new cross-sectoral planning with focus on poverty reduction in the CPRGS 
has demonstrated that more balanced development objectives can be attained also in the 
country’s strategic development framework. The old SEDPs maintained an economic-
focused policy to promote development, which was intended to enhance people’s living 
standard and reduce overall poverty. However, it did not address the social implications 
of economic reform. Adopting the social development perspective of the CPRGS has, in 
particular, strengthened the ambition to achieve sustainable growth.
 
 (ii) The formulation process of CPRGS has established a new mechanism for policy-
making in Vietnam. It provided a forum for cross-sectoral policy-making and added new 
voices from actors outside the government circle, which is unusual in the context of 
Vietnamese policy-making. The traditional model gave responsibility for national 
development planning and major socio-economic policies to MPI and its think-tank 
institutes. The CPRGS has involved new participants in the government’s policy debate. 
The consultative debates leading up to the CPRGS included Vietnamese NGOs and local 
communities through workshops and participatory poverty assessments (Conway 2004; 
IMF 2004). Selective draft versions were prepared to allow international donors to 
comment on policies and proposals, which reflects a new way of cooperating with 
external partners regarding development planning in Vietnam. The way donors have been 
involved and consulted in the CPRGS has given them a new stronger role in the policy 
debate: foreign donors have been accepted as legitimate partners in the debate even 
though the sense of national sovereignty remains strong, and even though there are still 
aspects of policy on which external donors are not supposed to comment remain 
(Conway 2004). The broader public engagement is clearly in line with the key political 
objectives of the PRSP process that the donor community hoped to introduce in Vietnam.  
Another impact on policy-making concerns the power relationships within the central 
government. The establishment of the inter-ministerial drafting committee suggests that 
the relationship between MPI and line ministries has changed. During the drafting 
process of CPRGS, they worked together as a team to discuss poverty reduction in a more 
comprehensive and cross-sectoral manner than what had been done earlier. According to 
Conway (2004), the CPRGS drafting process may have empowered line ministries in 
their relations to MPI. However, in the short term, MPI maintains a strong position, since 
it has the lead role in drafting the CPRGS and guiding the reforms in the area of planning 
and decentralization. In the long run, however, MPI’s role is likely to be reduced by the 
new mode of policy-making, where it has to enter into broad roundtable debates 
regarding policy choices with all other ministries (rather than separate and bilateral 
discussion as previously): this is likely to force the MPI to accept more of the strategic 
objectives of other ministries. Apart from the influence on the mode of policy-making, 
the CPRGS has contributed to changing the nature of planning. The development policy 
planning under the CPRGS framework has introduced a new set of policy objectives that 
has been managed under explicit resource constraints. The traditional SEDPs did not 
provide any strategic development framework with concrete policy objectives and budget 
constraints to guide resource allocation. Instead, it focused more on delivering ideologies 
and political aims, and providing input targets. 
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inclusive development and growth priorities, the CPRGS will have fundamental 
implications for resource allocation. As discussed above, administrative and budgetary 
decentralization is in the interest of provincial authorities and localities. The CPRGS has 
facilitated the decentralization process, both by providing resources for local authorities 
and by providing an arena where the views and priorities of local authorities can 
influence the policy making process. Through the channels to policy making provided by 
the CPRGS, sectoral and provincial authorities have acquired much broader scope for 
innovative policies as well as access to resources from the national budget and external 
funds.  
In sum, the relations with the donor community have contributed to the changes of the 
old conventional style of policy planning. Comprehensive consultation with donors and 
domestic stakeholders in drafting the 2006 – 2010 SEDP marked a giant step in this 
regard. It reflected both the government’s new visions and the changing attitudes towards 
foreign donors, as well as the changes in the power relationships within the state and  
between the state and non-state stakeholders. As a consequence of the CPRGS, donors 
have increased their collective bargaining power with respect to the Vietnamese 
government. Above all, just by having created the CPRGS, the Vietnamese government 
has accepted to join the development policy debate driven by donors. 
5. The future  
The previous section examined the changes in the institutional setting for development 
planning and development cooperation with foreign donors, and argued that one of the 
most prominent external influences from foreign aid is a change in the role of the state. 
This process of change is likely to continue as the integration with the world economy 
proceeds and creates new interest groups that are unwilling to return to the old ways. 
Although it is hard to predict how the next steps will look, it is possible to identify a few 
of the factors that will influence the direction of change. Some of these are related to the 
degree of decentralization, the character of the budget process, and the role of the donor 
community. 
Central planning vs. Decentralization  
Vietnam’s central planning system is in a process of transition. As discussed earlier, the 
role of MPI and its relations with local authorities and line ministries are changing as a 
result of various legal and institutional reforms. Recently, there have been calls for a 
change that would transform MPI into a Ministry of Economics, where its role could be 
more clearly limited to the management of national economic policy, while the functions 
related to investment and capital planning should be moved to the MoF. Other 
suggestions call for a merger of MPI and MoF. It seems unlikely that either of these 
views can be realized in the short term, as the government still wants to maintain some 
elements of central planning to control the national economy. However, MPI is now 
expected to collaborate intimately with the MoF, which is gradually growing stronger, to 
coordinate the capital and current expenditure sides of public expenditure. Increasingly, 
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as noted above.   
Decentralization has also begun slowly. It is slow since the central government is still 
guiding its progress. On the one hand, decentralization in development planning and 
budget management has empowered sub-national governments and localities. On the 
other hand, the capacity and institutions at the provincial and local levels are presently 
not adequate for meeting the demands of further decentralization. Some cities and 
provinces are more developed and better prepared for the change, but the majority of 
provinces lack the capacity and institutional conditions. This indicates that the central 
government might focus less on whether changes are allowed, but more on what 
opportunities and demands decentralization is likely to cause. For instance, despite 
budget decentralization, it is not clear how responsibilities are decentralized for managing 
those funds that do not belong to the mainstream budget. Moreover, 80percent of 
provinces face more or less chronic budget deficits, making decentralization a nominal 
change without much real content. Hence, these provinces still rely on the “giving and 
asking for” system for central fund allocation. This is not likely to change with a new tax 
and revenue system (Le 2004, pp. 26-27).  
The comprehensive support of the donor community is needed to overcome the lack of 
local capacity for planning and budget management. At the same time, further reforms to 
facilitate decentralization may be needed to define the local authorities’ accountability, 
responsibility, and incentives. Unless the central government can see the real need for 
decentralization, it will not have the right incentives to accommodate decentralization. 
Some examples of rational incentives for a government to decentralize are (i) to create a 
greater managerial efficiency, effectiveness and performance in meeting local needs; (ii) 
to improve public participation in government; (iii) to get public service delivery in the 
right place; (iv) to create a synergistic partnership in the provision of services to the 
people; (v) to create competitive performance spirit in provision of services to the people. 
(Blunt 2004, p.72). In terms of these decentralization incentives, the process has so far 
mainly focused on the first item, i.e. efficiency as seen from the point of view of the 
government and its sub-national authorities. Meanwhile, decentralization for service 
delivery to the local population has not been prioritized. Therefore, decentralization has 
sometimes been described as “de-concentration” of state tasks. It is understandable that it 
has sometimes been difficult to get the participation of the local communities and civil 
society groups in this process. It seems clear that further reform, including promotion and 
institutionalization of the role of civil society, will be required to proceed further with 
decentralization. Such measures would help ensure more openness and participation, 
which in turn would improve service delivery to the people at both national and local 
levels. Supporting the development of an open civil society that empowers people and 
supports the participation of social groups has been a political objective of many donors, 
especially the Western Like-Minded Group. So far, these donors have encouraged 
bottom-up reforms and development at the grass-root level as a way to create demand for 
the central government to adopt policy changes. However, an integrated approach, with 
continued support to the grass-root level together with pressure for institutional reforms 
at the central level, is likely to be a more efficient strategy for donors than a decision to 
focus on either of the two. 
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Another area where further changes are likely concerns the sectoral allocation of both 
domestic and external funds. On the basis of the existing plans regarding the sectoral 
allocation of ODA for 2006-2010, it seems clear that the allocation for social and rural 
development will increase. However, it is unlikely that there will be any sharp increase in 
the state budget for education and health-care in these areas, unless there are reforms of 
the socialization policies in these sectors. Socialization in this context refers to the shift in 
the financing burden from the state budget to user fees and other private funding sources. 
However, it should be noted that these policies are increasingly criticized for their 
unintended negative effects on the poor in general (see Kokko and Tingvall 2007). 
The recent decision to include the social development components of the CPRGS in the 
2006-2010 SEDP is one of the main reasons for the shift in the budget shares of different 
sectors. It remains to be seen whether or not the government will aim for a fully 
integrated development framework where all resources – including ODA – are included 
(as desired by the donor community). However, as long as there is a separate ODA 
Strategic Framework annexed to the SEDP, there is a reason to believe that the 
government aims to maintain some separation between ODA and domestic resources. 
This notwithstanding, the CPRGS has arguably already influenced the planning process 
to such an extent that it may not matter exactly how the formal planning system is 
structured. There are strong enough incentives for provinces to include CPRGS 
components into their budgets to guarantee that the funamental parts of the CPRGS will 
be integrated into the five-year plan as well.  
Investment and resource allocations for the development of industry and infrastructure 
will probably continue to hold a large share of the state budget. This suggests that the role 
of the private sector in these areas is expected to remain limited. With the ongoing 
decentralization of the state budget, the government will allocate a given amount of 
investment funds and assign a set of investment indicators to individual ministries and for 
education and science to individual provinces. The detailed allocation of resources within 
these broad expenditure areas will be decided by the provinces. The increased autonomy 
and incentives to generate funds outside the state budget is likely to change the 
investment planning system in provinces. This could potentially help overcome the 
existing problem where provinces compete for the allocation of investment resources to 
those industries that are defined to be of strategic importance. For instance, the 
construction of cement, sugar, and steel industries appears as a priority in almost every 
provincial plan because these industries have been identified as state priorities, which 
makes it easier to get centrally budgeted resources for them. If provincial authorities and 
donors instead take the local conditions as a starting point for their joint development 
plans, the likely result is an improved balance in the sectoral distribution of investment, 
as well as between capital expenditure and recurrent expenditure, both at the provincial 
and central levels.  
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Donor support to the government’s development and reform policies has been strong 
during the last decade, as indicated by the substantial annual aid pledges to Vietnam. The 
strong support reflects the positive relations between the government and the donor 
community, and contributes to reducing the worries that have historically been related to 
foreign interest in Vietnam. ODA has not only been economically important for different 
state funded development projects, but it has also focused attention on the need to 
strengthen the state’s capacity at various levels, through legal reforms, parliamentary 
development, and anti-corruption programs. ODA has also generated many diverse 
interests within and outside the government. Both donors and national aid beneficiaries 
want to be involved and play a greater role in the government’s development policy 
debates in areas where aid is used as a tool for development. This trend has affected the 
way the government’s policy institutions work and it has altered various domestic power 
relationships. Thus, an institutional framework that is adaptive to the new phase of 
dynamic relations with external partners and domestic interest groups has begun to 
emerge.  
Some of the ongoing reforms, like the aim to publish concrete criteria for ODA 
mobilization and allocation to provinces, illustrate how much the government has adapted 
to the changing circumstances. In the Hanoi Core Statement on Aid Effectiveness 2005 
agreed between the government of Vietnam and the donor community at the Mid-term 
Consultative Group Meeting (CG Meeting) in Can Tho, the government promises donors 
to take the leadership to guide and coordinate ODA through national/sectoral program, 
while donors commit to use these plans as a basis for their funding decisions. This 
requires that the government presents a single comprehensive program and budget 
framework, where it identifies investment priorities which the donors can use for their 
own aid allocation. Hence, the government is expected to define what forms of ODA it 
wants and how it wants it to be delivered, instead of focusing on maximizing the total 
value of aid inflows.
12 One motive for this new policy could be that the government is 
increasingly aware that Vietnam will soon graduate from its status as a concessional 
credit recipient. ODA inflows are likely to fall, both in absolute and relative terms, and it 
is more important than before to ascertain that the available development assistance is 
used efficiently. 
The line-up of donors is also changing. The UNDP and a few bilateral donors with a long 
history in the country played an important role in supporting the government’s reform 
initiativess during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. Today, their roles as lead 
donors have been taken over by the international financial institutions and some larger 
bilateral donors, like Japan, who provide substantial credits for infrastructure investments 
and other reforms  Given the comprehensive reforms Vietnam needs in order to meet the 
challenges from socio-economic changes and international integration, it is likely that the 
government will need donor support in the future as well. However, it is unclear what 
kind of development assistance Vietnam will strive for. The World Bank and some other 
international donors with large amounts of resources – but also strict conditionality 
                                                 
 
  23regarding the use of these resources – are positioned to play important roles in future 
development cooperation. The relative strength of these donors suggests that it may be 
more difficult to preserve Vietnamese ownership and autonomy over the developmetn 
agenda than during the first decades of Doi Moi. At the same time, Vietnam is probably 
less dependent on financial assistance and better able to create domestic investment 
resources than ever before. Moreover, the cost of external funding will increase when 
Vietnam graduates from the low-income country group and loses access to concessional 
credits. This suggests that credits for physical infrastructure may become less important 
in future development cooperation. Instead, it possible that programs focusing on 
institutional development and “soft” infrastructure” – public administration, 
parliamentary development, anticorruption programs, leadership training, and higher 
education in general – will be more prominent. In these areas, UNDP and traditional 
development partners like Sweden still play an important role and have comparative 
advantages in opening doors to cooperation in new sensitive reform areas.  
It is unclear how the balance between these two types of development cooperation will 
develop. Yet, the present choices provide an indication of how substantial the changes in 
the Vietnamese government’s attitudes towards foreign development partners really are: 
the choices Vietnam confronts are not mainly related to worries about ownership or 
autonomy, but concern what kinds of development cooperation and what level of 
integration are most efficient and valuable.  
6. Concluding remarks 
The development of the relations between Vietnam and its foreign development partners 
can be summarized in the form of four observations. 
The first point to note is that the lessons from the economic relations with the Soviet 
Union have had a fundamental impact on Vietnam’s attitudes towards foreign aid and the 
relations with foreign donors during the decades of Doi Moi. Vietnam grew heavily 
dependent on Soviet aid before the mid-1980s – largely on the conditions outlined by the 
Soviet Union – and the termination of aid flows that preceded the decline and eventual 
collapse of the Soviet Union was a severe shock to the Vietnamese economy. The 
common Vietnamese perception is that the country gave up too much of its autonomy in 
return for Soviet aid. One of the strongest determinants of Vietnam’s early relationship 
with Western donors was to avoid repeating the same mistakes. For a long time, the key 
priorities for policy making were therefore national security and independence, defined in 
a broad sense to include economic aspects. The overriding goal was to avoid renewed 
dependence on external resources and relationships. One consequence for development 
cooperation with foreign partners was the requirement that Vietnam should maintain 
strong ownership of its development agenda and control any foreign resources allowed to 
enter the country. Over time, the deepening relationships with some donors like Sweden 
and the UNDP have gradually taught the government to trust external partners and to 
open up for policy dialogues. This has reduced the focus on national security, sovereignty, 
and independence, and softened the Vietnamese leadership’s hesitant attitudes to 
international cooperation. 
  24The second observation is that the institutional setting for national development planning 
and integration has been determined by the overall attitudes towards foreign donors. The 
need for strong Vietnamese ownership of the development agenda required a decision-
making structure where much power was centralized to a strong actor (the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment) that could exercise ownership on Vietnamese terms and 
integrate development aid into the country’s economic plans. The fact that MPI had 
primary responsibility both for the national economic plans and for the resources 
provided in the form of ODA was important to facilitate this task. However, the 
centralization of ODA management was not only a way for the government to allocate 
domestic and international resources according to its own preferences, but also a way to 
reduce the bargaining power of external donors. For instance, donors were not 
encouraged to initiate their own projects - largely capital investment projects - but instead 
asked to select projects from priority lists prepared by the MPI. These lists took into 
account the specific interests and priorities of individual donors, but only to the extent 
that they coincided with the interests of Vietnamese authorities. 
This institutional structure has slowly begun to change as a result of the changing 
attitudes towards foreign donors. As foreign aid organizations have been allowed more 
freedom in seeking collaboration with provincial and regional authorities, the government 
has relaxed its strict central control of aid allocations. In particular, donors are allowed to 
initiate smaller ODA projects directly with the relevant regional or provincial authorities. 
This implies a change not only in the relations between MPI and foreign donors, but also 
a transformation of the relations between MPI, provincial authorities, line ministries, and 
various stakeholders outside the state: MPI is taking on the role of an intermediary rather 
than acting as a master planner, as it did in the past. 
The changing role of MPI can, in fact, be seen as an illustration of the changing status of 
central planning and resource allocation in general. Decentralization accompanied by 
major legal reforms is underway, giving increased autonomy and decision-making power 
to provinces and localities. This development can be interpreted as a cautious shift away 
from central planning. A third observation therefore concerns the adjustments taking 
place in the Vietnamese planning system as a consequence of the collaboration with 
foreign development partners. The adoption of the CPRGS marks a change in how 
development assistance and development issues are included in the plans. Before CPRGS, 
Vietnamese authorities tried to keep ODA separate from other resources available for 
public investment: the objective was to maintain the system of central planning with as 
little outside interference as possible. However, over time, the position of MPI and the 
separation between ODA and other public investment resources met pressure from two 
sides. On the one hand, foreign development partners insisted that the government should 
act to integrate ODA resource into the central budget, in order to be able to provide local 
resources to complement the foreign contributions. On the other hand, regional and 
provincial authorities gradually learned that they could interact directly with foreign 
development partners in order to promote ODA project ideas, instead of only lobbying 
MPI to include their projects in the priority lists presented to the donor community. With 
promises of financial backing from a donor, they could increase their bargaining power in 
the negotiations with MPI, raising the likelihood that MPI would support the project and 
provide counterpart financing to to match the foreign resources.  
  25The two processes eroded the traditional form of central planning where MPI directed 
development according to the preferences of the central government. The CPRGS has 
institutionalized a new set of policy objectives for public investment and initiated a new 
structure for decisions about resource allocation. It may also have contributed to the 
emergence of new power relationship within the central government, particularly 
between line ministries and MPI. Arguably, MPI is becoming weaker while line 
ministries and other stakeholders are gaining more influence. The changing institutional 
structure is increasingly adapted to a market-oriented economy, in which the interests of 
many different stakeholders are assumed to be taken into account in development 
planning. 
Finally, it can be noted that the Vietnamese economy is undergoing a number of changes 
that are arguably in the interest of many of Vietnam’s foreign development partners. 
Some examples are decentralization, changes in the planning and budgeting process, 
increased public participation in policy debates, and a stronger role for the private sector. 
The donor community has clearly played a role for the diffusion of the new practices, and 
many of the changes started in aid-funded programs but have gradually spread to other 
areas. The role of Vietnam’s foreign development partners have been to introduce ideas, 
exert some pressures for change, but also to provide an arena where the government has 
been able to test new ideas and refine its thinking on development policy. To some extent, 
it can be argued that the donor community has taken on the roles played by civil society 
and a political opposition in parliamentary democracies. Although Vietnam still has a 
long way to go in its transition from central planning to a more market oriented system 
with a strong civil society representation in policy making, it can be argued that the 
trends are favorable, and that the relations with the donor community are contributing 
positively to Vietnam’s development.  
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